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Labor Market Segmentation and the Union Wage Premium
ABSTRACT
Studies of the earnings of union workers have consistently shown that they earn
considerably more than nonunion workers. This paper considers whether part of
this observed union/nonunion differential is due to unions organizing high paying
primary sector jobs. We extend our earlier work on the dual labor market in which
we used an unknown regime switching regression to identify two labor market sec-
tors --ahigh wage primary sector and a low wage secondary sector. Here we es-
timate a model where worker's wages are determined by one of three wage equations:
a union wage equation, a nonunion primary equation or a nonunion secondary
equation. If individuals are in the union sector their sector is treated as
known. If they are not then their sector is treated as unknown. Parameter es-
timates for this model suggest that union/nonunion differences are very large for
average workers even when comparing union and nonunion primary workers.
We continue to find distinct primary and secondary sectors with wage equations
similar to those that would be expected from the dual market perspective. Since
it appears that union workers may be receiving large wage premiums it seems likely
that there is non-price rationing of union jobs.If there is, our finding in
previous papers of non-price rationing of primary sector jobs may have been due
only to the rationing of union jobs. We test for the existence of non-price ra-
tioning of nonunion primary sector employment in this three sector model and
continue to find evidence that at least black workers find it difficult to secure
primary sector employment.
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Sloan School of Management School of Social Sciences
M.I.T. University of California
Cambridge, MA 02139 Irvine, CA 92717
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Thereare many studies which demonstrate that workers in unionjobs earn more
thanapparently equivalent workers in nonunion jobs (Ashenfelter, 1978; Mellow,
1981; Welch, 1980; Pencavel, 1970; Kahn, 1977; Schmidt, 1978; Farber, 1980; Leigh,
1981; Podgursky, 1980; Duncan and Stafford, 1980; Duncan and Leigh, 1980; Lee,
1978; Oaxaca, 1975). Many have argued that unions are not responsible for these
higher wages, but instead unions form in jobs in which high quality workers are
employed, that is, unions organize high wage jobs. One response to this argument
is to develop models in which union status is endogenous and the unobserved fac-
tors determining union status are allowed to be correlated with unobserved worker
attributes which affect wages (Duncan and Leigh, 1980; Lee, 1978; Pencavel, 1970;
Kahn, 1977; Schmidt, 1978; Farber, 1979; Leigh, 1981; Duncan and Stafford, 1980).
When union status is treated as endogenous, statistical analysis continues to
indicate the existence of a union/nonunion wage differential. However, dual labor
market theory (Doeringer and Piore, 1971) and a number of recent mainstream the-
ories suggest that there is non-price rationing of high wage jobs (Calvo, 1979;
Weiss, 1980; Stoft, 1982; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Bowles, 1985; Dickens,
1985).In this case, it is necessary to control not for the unobserved charac-
teristics of the worker, but for the type of job a worker is in. This paper de-
velops an approach which allows us to compare the wages received by workers in
high wage primary sector nonunion jobs with the wages received by equivalent
workers in union jobs. We continue to find that workers in union jobs receive a
large wage premium.
Unless high union wages compensate union workers for undesirable job char-
acteristics, there must be non-price rationing of union jobs; Abowd and Farber
1(1982) and Farber (1983) provide evidence which supports the existence of ra-
tioning.It is possible that the rationing of high wage jobs which we observe
in two previous papers (Dickens and Lang 1985a&b) is only the rationing of union
jobs. Although the numeric importance of unions has declined in the U.S. economy,
union workers continue to make up almost one-fifth of the civilian labor force
and are more important among the full-time adult male workers who comprised our
samples in our earlier studies. This paper extends our earlier work on testing
for non-price rationing of high wage (primary) market jobs to a model in which
there are three sectors of the labor force --aunion sector, and a nonunion sector
consisting of two parts, a primary sector and a secondary sector. The definitions
of the primary and secondary sectors are drawn from the literature on dual labor
markets and are discussed in greater detail in our earlier work. In essence the
primary sector consists of high wage jobs in which there are substantial returns
to human capital variables (education and experience) while the secondary sector
consists of low wage jobs in which there is little or no return to these variables.
We estimate wage equations for each sector and treat the sector of employment
as endogenous. Thus we use an endogenous switching model. The innovation con-
sists of developing a model in which it is known if individuals are in one of the
regimes (the union sector), but if they are not in that sector, it is not known
in which of the two remaining regimes --theprimary and secondary sectors --they
are employed.We estimate this system of equations using maximum likelihood.
As in our previous work, the results provide support for the existence of two
distincttypes of nonunion employment and for the existence of non-price rationing
of primary jobs.
2II. THE MODEL
Workers may be employed in either the union or nonunion sectors.If they
are employed in the union sector, they receive a wage w. which is determined
according to the following relation
(1) in w .= XB +e
U]. i U 11].
where X. is a vector of observed individual characteristics, B is a conformable
1. U
vector of parameters and a. represents unobserved factors affecting the wage.
Workers who are not employed in union jobs may be in either of two other sectors.
We specify separate wage equations for these two sectors:
(2) lnw .=X.B +e 1ip p1.
(3) mw .=X.B +e 5115 5].
wherethe variables are defined analogously to those in equation (1).
In order to conform to the dual labor market view, wages in the primary sector
should generally be higher than in the secondary sector and the return to educa-
tion and experience should be higher in the primary sector.
Even if we were able to identify directly which nonunion workers were in
primary jobs rather than in secondary jobs, equations (1) -(3)could not be es-
timated consistently by ordinary least squares since sector of employment may not
be exogenous. If workers were free to choose in which sector they were employed,
we would expect to find that workers with unusually high wages in union jobs would
3be more likely to be employed in those jobs and similarly forprimary and sec-
ondary sector jobs. Consequently,
(4) E(e.j employed in sector j)0
and the errors in each equation (the e..s) are likely to be correlated with the
explanatory variables. This is a standard sample selection problem of the type
discussed in Heckman (1976, 1979), Lee, Maddala and Trost (1980) andGriliches,
Hall and Ilausman (1978). Solutions to this problem are well known andcan be based
on either two-stage estimators as in the first three of these papers or on maximum
likelihood techniques as in the last of these papers. In eithercase, one begins
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where y*s represent unobserved variables measuring tendency to be in eachsector,
Cs are parameters and vs represent unobserved determinants of sectoral attachment.
Individuals are in sector jif
(8) Yj3> 'ki for all k not equal to j.
4This mechanism may be given a choice theoretic interpretation. If individuals
are free to choose their sector of employment, they will choose the sector which
gives them the highest utility. Under a set of somewhat restrictive conditions,
we can test the assumption of free choice by comparing the parameters of the wage
equations with those of the switching equations (5-7). The proof is provided in
Dickens and Lang (1985a) and is not repeated here; we limit ourselves to outlining
the assumptions and conclusions.
We begin by assuming that individuals are wealth maximizers, i.e. that they
are indifferent with respect to their sector of employment, and that they have
perfect information regarding lifetime earnings in all sectors.It is then pos-
sible to place precise restrictions on the relation between parameters in the wage
equations and the switching equations under either of two extreme assumptions:
the return to experience in a sector is worth more in that sector than in any other
sector and, as Lang and Ruud (1986) find, that individual discount rates are in-
dependent of the Xs or, alternatively, that in each sector the wage depends only
on total experience and not on the sector in which that experience was acquired.
In the first case, individuals will make once and for all decisions regarding
their sector of employment and will remain in that sector throughout their work
lives.In the second case, workers, choose employment in whichever sector they
receive the highest wage at that moment. It is possible to show in the first case,
approximating the lengths of people's working lives as infinity, that the Cs all
equal the Bs except for the experience term (for which C should equal zero) and
for the constant term.In the second case, all of the Cs (including experience
and constant terms) should equal the Bs.
It is therefore possible to test the free choice hypothesis by testing these
cross-equation restrictions, Of course, the assumption that individuals do not
I-
careabout their sector of employment is restrictive.In particular, we would
5expect that people care not only about their wages but also about their working
conditions. For example, if all workers prefer primary sector employment to em-
ployment in the other sectors, the constant term in C will be greater than it
otherwise would be. The C and B coefficients for schooling may diverge if more
educated workers value primary sector employment more than less educated workers
do. Thus, we would expect some divergence between the two sets of coefficients.
However, we can check whether the divergence is compatible with other evidence
on tastes for the nonpecuniary aspects of employment in the sectors.
Whether individuals are free to choose their sector of employment or whether
there is some form of nonprice rationing mechanism, estimation proceeds in much
the same way.If the individual's sector of employment were known, the system
of equations (1) -(3),(5) -(7),could be estimated by a straight-forward ex-
tension of the techniques developed in the papers cited above. However, in the
present case, estimation is further complicated by the absence of direct infor-
mation on whether workers are employed in the primary or secondary sector if they
are not employed in a union job. Estimation of switching models with unknown
regimes is discussed in Goldfeld and Quandt (1976).Dickens and Lang (1985a&b)
develop and estimate an endogenous switching model with unknown regimes.
The model developed here combines elements of switching models with known
and unknown regimes. The likelihood for individuals who are in the union sector
is the likelihood for workers in a particular sector for a model with three known
regimes. The likelihood for the primary and secondary sectors consists of two
elements of the likelihood for an endogenous switching model with three unknown
regimes. The next section develops the likelihood function formally.
6III. DERIVATION OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION
Beforewe can derive the likelihood function we must specify the distribution of








and that errors are independent across individuals or E(e.e.')O for all i not
equal to j. We denote the elements of S as
Given the above model and these assumptions about the distribution of e, the
likelihood of observing someone with a union job and with characteristics X. and
e .is ui
Prob(Unionlx.,e .)•(e,s) 1 Ui. uiuu
where Ø( ) is the density function for a mean zero normal random variable with
variance 5uu• The probability of union membership can be rewritten in terms of
observables as
(10) Prob(unionlX.,z.) =
7B [(-X.(C -c )-(z.-X.B )s /s )/(s /s))5, U1 U S1 1U ul UU 11 lu uu
(-X(C-C)-(z.-X.B) 1 )/(sll+s222s 12 )2/s )
wherez=ln w. and where B is the integral of the standard normal bivariate
1 1 U
density function from the two arguments to infinity with correlation
(S11+s22-2S12-(s1-s2)2/S5.
Workers who are not union members have their wages determined by one of two
wage equations depending on which sector they are in. Since we do not know in which
of the two sectors a nonunion worker is employed, the likelihood of observing
someone with characteristics X,, e .ande is i_ t Si
(11) L. =Prob(PrimaryX.,e.)(e.,s )+Prob(SecondaryX.,e .)(e.,s).
Again, the conditional probabilities of sectoral attachment can be rewritten in












with correlation (s12sl 2I
IV. DATA, ESTIMATION AND HYPOTHESIS TESTING.
Themodel was estimated using data from the January 1983 wave of the Current
Population Survey. The sample was restricted to employed male heads of households
who had worked more than 1000 hours during the previous year in the private sec-
tor, who were over 20 years of age and wider 65 and who earned more than the
minimum wage. The sample was further restricted to those for whom information
on all the following attributes was available: either the person's wage, or if
that was not available his normal weekly earnings and his normal weekly hours of
work, age, years of education, race, marital status, and whether or not he lived
in an SMSA. This left us with a sample of 4392. For the purpose of estimation
we constructed people's wages as being equal to their reported hourly wage if that
was available. If not, it was set equal to their normal weekly earnings divided
by their normal weekly hours of work. The standard measure of job experience was
constructed for each person in the sample as his age minus years of schooling
minus six. Dummy variables were constructed and set equal to one for those who
were white, those who had never been married and those who lived in an SMSA.
Not all the parameters of the model are identifiable. Three of the elements
of the variance covariance matrix cannot be identified in cross-section data --
9s, s, and since we never observe individuals who are simultaneously in
two sectors. In addition, only two of the C vectors can be independently iden-
tified so we normalize C0. In the absence of any other restrictions on the Cs
and Ss it is impossible to identify all the parameters of the switching equations.
Consequently we normalize and to equal 1.
As explained above, the hypothesis of free choice between the sectors implies
a constraint on the values of the Cs. With C constrained to zero, free choice
5
between the primary and secondary sector implies that certain elements of
C=B-B. However, this test would only be meaningful if tastes for primary
versus secondary employment did not depend on people's observed characteristics.
In fact, we would expect that they would. The difference can be thought of as
the compensating differential necessary to make the average worker of a particular
type indifferent between primary and secondary sector employment. In general it
is difficult to know a priori how the Cs might differ from B-B, but an exception
to this is the dummy variable for race. Previous studies provide evidence that
blacks prefer more stable employment (Viscusi, 1979) and have greater demand for
occupational safety (Kahn, 1983). These are characteristics which are commonly
associated with primary employment so we would expect blacks to have a preference
for primary employment. Thus we would expect that the element of C corresponding
to the coefficient of white would be less than or equal to B -B .Wewould also ps
expect that those with more education would be more likely to prefer primary em-
ployment and thus we would expect the relevant element of C ￿ B-B.
The test of these two hypothesis is less than straight-forward because of
the identification problems discussed above.In general, any one equality con-
straint on a parameter of a switching equation constitutes only a renormalization
of the likelihood function since it is then possible to remove the normalization
of the variance.Further, it is possible that one or both of the inequality
10constraints would not be binding.In our two previous papers the C associated
with education was estimated to be less than the difference between B and B and
p s
the C associated with white was greater than the relevant difference when the
variance of the switching equation was normalized to equal 1. Either of the free
choice constraints could have been reconciled with the estimated values for the
Cs and Bs by renormalizing, but not both at the same time. To test the joint
hypothesis that more educated workers and blacks should have a non-negative com-
pensating difference for taking secondary employment we imposed both the equality
constraints, set the variance free, and constructed a likelihood ratio test with
one degree of freedom. The natural interpretation is that one constraint con-
stitutes a renormalization and the second a real constraint.
The situation may also arise in which renormalizing the switching equation
to make an estimated C consistent with the values for the Bs would be impossible
since it would require the standard deviation of the conditional switching
equation error to be negative. Thus it is sometimes possible to test a single
constraint if the values for the Bs together with the free choice equality con-
straint imply that the corresponding C has the wrong sign. For example, below
we find that the C for the white dummy is positive while B-B is negative. There
is no renormalization which can make the observed coefficients consistent with
the joint hypothesis of free choice and that blacks prefer primary sector em-
ployment.If we can reject the joint hypothesis that either B-B￿0 or for
the dummy variable for white then either blacks do not have free choice or they
prefer secondary employment relative to whites. To test this compound null hy-
pothesis we find the values of B-B and C for the white dummy which minimize the
value of the Wald statistic subject to the constraint that either B -B =0 or C0. Ps
If we can reject for this value of the null we can reject for any value of the
compound null.
11The likelihood function was written in FORTRAN. The Berndt, Hall, Hall and
Hausman (1974) algorithm was used to find the maximum. We used the implementation
of this algorithm in Paul Ruud's GNOME program. We estimated the unconstrained
model using both analytic and numeric derivatives. Due to problems with the ac-
curacy of the approximation to the bivariate integral at extreme values we found
that the maximization algorithm was better behaved when we used numeric deriva-
tives. We also encountered several local maximums in estimating the model, though
none were qualitatively different.The coefficient values reported below were
those associated with the maximum with the highest likelihood value. For starting
values we used coefficient estimates for the primary and secondary sector wage
equations and C derived from our previous paper (Dickens and Lang l985b) and with
coefficients for C -C derived from a standard probit on union membership and up
coefficients for the union wage equation taken from OLS estimates using a union
only sample. We obtained qualitatively similar results when we started with the
same values for the primary and secondary sector wage equations and switching
equation but used the primary sector coefficients for the union sector wage
equation.
V. RESULTS
The first two columns in table 1 present OLS estimates of log wage equations for
union and nonunion workers. Except for the slightly higher coefficient on white
in the union equation these results are very similar to those obtained by others
12in past studies.In general personal characteristics have a smaller effect on
union than nonunion wages.
Turning to the switching model we began by estimating the full system with
experience and experience squared excluded from the equations measuring underly-
ing tendency to be in the primary and secondary sectors. As discussed in section
III, this specification will be appropriate if individuals are free to choose
between primary and secondary employment and if there is "sector-specific" human
capital. We then estimated the full system without these two constraints. Both
the likelihood ratio test and the Wald test reject the constraints at the .01
level. We therefore limit ourselves to discussion of the unrestricted estimates.
As in our previous work, there is evidence of two distinct sectors in the
nonunion labor market (see Table I). In the primary sector, there is a substan-
tial return to education (6%) and to experience in a worker's early years.In
the secondary sector, there are returns to both schooling and experience, but the
estimated return to schooling is less than half that received by primary workers,
and the returns to experience start out being less than half those received by
primary workers and peak slightly earlier. The results are therefore supportive
of the dual labor market typology although the two sectors are less distinct than
those observed in our previous studies. It appears that removing union jobs from
the analysis makes it more difficult to isolate the two sectors among nonunion
workers.
We also confirm our earlier findings that there is non-price rationing of
employment in the primary sector.If we were to interpret the coefficients of
the primary/secondary sector switching equation as the difference between the wage
parameters plus a compensating differential for secondary employment, our point
estimates would indicate that the desire to be in the primary sector increases
with education andishigher for whites than for blacks. This second finding
13contradicts empirical evidence presented above that blacks have stronger prefer-
ences for several characteristics of primary employment. Using the test described
above, we can easily reject the hypothesis that either the C is negative or that
B-B is positive. The Wald test takes a minimum value of 11.87 in the space of
the compound null hypothesis whenB-B is 0 and C is set to .598.The .01
critical value for the Wald statistic with two degrees of freedom is 9.21. Thus
we can reject the hypothesis that blacks preferences for primary employment are
greater than or equal to whites. Since we also wish to test the hypothesis that
more educated workers prefer primary sector employment and since in this case the
values of C and B-B are in the space of the null hypothesis a conservative test
of the two compound null hypotheses is to use the Wald value computed above and
to compare it to the critical value for four degrees of freedom. In this case
the test is no longer significant at the .01 level, but it is at the .05 level
(critical value of 9.488).
Further evidence for the existence of non-price rationing of primary jobs
is provided by comparison of the wages individuals receive in the primary and
secondary sectors. An individual with the average characteristics of a nonunion
worker would receive $11.47 per hour in the primary sector but only $6.98 in the
secondary sector. Moreover, the expected wage in the primary sector is greater
for virtually all categories of workers.For example, a white with no labor
market experience who had never married and lived outside an SMSA would receive
a higher wage in the primary sector if he had at least seven years of education.
Workers with labor market experience or those who have been married, live in an
SMSA or who are black receive even higher wages in the primary sector relative
to the secondary sector. We would expect that most workers would prefer primary
employment. Unless the marginal worker's preferences are very different from the
average worker's or those who are in secondary employment all would receive very
14low primary wages, our results indicate that people are not free to choose between
the sectors.
Although primary workers generally earn considerably more than secondary
workers, we continue to find evidence of a union/primary sector wage differential.
The average person in our sample would earn $14.26 in a union job but only $11.32
in a primary job, a difference of 26%. Since secondary wages are even lower than
those in the primary sector our estimate of the union/nonunion difference is among
the higher estimates found in the literature (Freeman and Medoff, 1981).
Our union wage equation also differs from those obtained by most previous
researchers. The return to schooling in the union sector is not only higher than
in the secondary sector, it is even higher than in the primary sector. In contrast
to the work cited in Freeman and Medoff (1981), we find no evidence to support
the view that unions reduce the return to schooling and thus reduce the variance
of earnings among workers with the same amount of labor market experience.It
is interesting that although our results differ notably from the "standard"
finding in the literature, they are consistent with evidence on the union status
of workers. Farber (1983) finds no evidence that the desire for a union job or
the probability of being selected from the queue for union jobs is related to
education. Using dummy variables for several categories of educational attainment
Farber's point estimates suggest that the most educated workers are more likely
than others to desire a union job and less likely to be selected from the queue
although neither coefficient is statistically significant and there is not a
monotonic relation between education and these probabilities. If the
union/nonunion wage differential decreased with education, we would expect more
educated workers to be less likely to choose to enter the queue for union jobs.
The similarity between Farber's and our findings and their divergence from
those of other researchers may reflect the more complicated sector selection
15models we use. Farber explicitly models both the choice to enter the union queue
and the selection of workers from that queue. If the highest productivity workers
tend not to enter the queue and the lowest productivity workers are not chosen
from the queue, a single selection equation may not provide a good approximation
to the "true" model.Although our model does not explicitly represent this se-
lection process, the presence of two selection equations allows the highest pro-
ductivity workers to be assigned to the primary sector and the lowest productivity
workers to be assigned to the secondary sector and thus our selection process may
be similar to the one in Farber's work. Analysis of our data indicates that the
average worker in the primary sector has more "human capital" than the average
worker in the union sector since the average nonunion worker has more education
than the average union worker and the model indicates that more educated workers
are most likely to be in the primary sector.
In contrast to our results for education, our estimates do confirm previous
work which suggests that the return to experience is higher in the nonunion sector
than in the union sector. The estimated return to experience in the union sector
is about half the return in the primary sector and similar to the return obtained
in the secondary sector. As can be seen in figures 1 and 2, wages peak at ap-
proximately the same time in all thvee sectors. Maximum earnings are estimated
to be at 32 years of experience in the primary sector, 31 years in the union sector
and 29 in the secondary sector.
Our results for experience might be taken as evidence in support of the "wage
standardization" hypothesis that unions reduce within union skill differentials.
However, our results for schooling contradict that hypothesis. Consequently they
suggest that the less steep lifetimes earnings profile in union jobs should be
attributed to some other factor. One possibility is that unionized firms nego-
tiate for less steeply sloped wage profiles.If upward sloping wage-earnings
16profiles are paid, at least in part, to solve problems of effortelicitation,
quitting, or worker quality (Lazear 1981) then the payment of a unionwage premium
provides similar incentives and thus lessens the need for theage-earnings pro-
file. (Lang, 1984).
The final results of interest are thoseconcerning race. In the OLS results
the coefficient on the dummy variable for race isroughly equal for the union and
nonunion samples. With our three sector model the black-whitewage differential
varies considerably across sectors. Whites earn over 25%more than blacks in the
union sector and about 16% more in the secondary sector. In theprimary sector
the difference is small and statistically insignificant.In contrast to these
results, the coefficient on the race dummy is small andinsignificant in the
switching equation for the union/secondary sector choice and blacksare more
likely to be in the union sector relative to the primary sector. As notedabove,
it seems to be more difficult for blacks to obtainprimary sector employment than
for whites. Interpreting these results literally it wouldseem that there is wage
discrimination against blacks in the union andsecondary sectors, and hiring
discrimination in the primary sector. However, these resultsare not entirely
consistent with our past work.
In our first study (Dickens and Lang 1985a)we found no evidence of wage
discrimination in the primary market and weak evidence that blacksreceived higher
wages than whites in the secondary market. In our second paper (Dickens andLang
1985b) we found blacks earning statistically significantly lowerwages in the
primary sector and higher wages in the secondary sector. Since the coefficient
estimates in the first paper were imprecise the results,though different, are
easily reconciled. The results for the current study withrespect to race in the
union and nonunion primary sector may also be consistent withour previous
findings. Though we find no evidence of significantwage discrimination in the
17nonunion primary sector in this study, the two previous studies confounded union
and nonunion primary so their finding of significant wage discrimination could
have been due to the discrimination in the union sectorHowever, the finding
here of significant wage discrimination against blacks in the secondary sector
is not consistent with past studies.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Our results indicate that the union/nonunion differential cannot be ascribed
to the tendency of unions to organize high wage primary jobs. Most workers would
earn more in the union sector than they do in the primary sector of the nonunion
labor market. Thus, our results are consistent with observations that there is
non-price rationing of union jobs.
The results presented here also provide support for our earlier findings that
there are two distinct sectors of the labor market, a high wage primary sector
with substantial returns to education and experience and a low wage secondary
sector with little or no return to education and experience. Evidently our pre-
vious findings were not due to our failure to distinguish between primary and
union jobs. Even when we take account of the existence of a union sector, there
are still two sectors with these distinct characteristics in the nonunion part
of the labor market. I
Moreoverour evidence continues to suggest the existence of non-price ra-
tioning of primary jobs in the nonunion sector. The rationing of primary jobs
which we found in our earlier work cannot be ascribed to the confounding of the
18primary and union sectors and to the rationing of union jobs. The higher wages
paid in the union sector indicate that there is probably rationing of union jobs
and that the typical worker would prefer a union job to a primary job. However,
if unable to obtain a union job, he would prefer a primary job to a secondary job.
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